Argonne National Laboratory
RERTR
Reduced Enrichment for Research and Test Reactors
Nuclear Engineering Division at Argonne
U.S. Department of Energy

IAEA/USA Interregional course on
Preparations to Ship Spent Nuclear Fuel (1997)

CHILEAN EXPERIENCE WITH SHIPMENT OF
RESEARCH REACTOR SPENT FUEL


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Contact:
Mr. Juan Klein
Comision Chilena de Energia Atomica
Amunategui 95
Santiago, Chile
Tel.: +56 2 273 1827
Fax: +56 2 273 8723
E-mail:

IAEA/USA Interregional Training Course

Technical and Administrative Preparations Required for Shipment of Research Reactor Spent Fuel to its Country of Origin

13-24 January 1997
Argonne, IL

Lecture L.13.2

CHILEAN EXPERIENCE WITH SHIPMENT OF
RESEARCH REACTOR SPENT FUEL

presented by

 

J. Klein and E. Saravia
Chilean Nuclear Energy Commission
Santiago - Chile


 

1.- Introduction

On May 14, 1996 the Executive Director of the Chilean Nuclear Energy Commission (CCHEN) received a letter from the Embassy of the United States in Santiago informing about the decision of the U. S. Department of Energy to accept and manage in the United States all the spent nuclear fuel listed in the Environmental Impact Statement (EIS). As stated in the referred document, the fuel, all which contains uranium enriched in the United States, is to be accepted over a thirteen year period.

Countries listed in the EIS as developing ones will have the cost of fuel shipments and management subsidized by the United States. Arrangements will be made through the Department of Energy Office of Spent Fuel Management.

On May 31, 1996 the CCHEN¥s Executive Director received a second letter from the Embassy of the United States in Santiago informing of the Record of Decision (ROD) for an environmental impact statement of a policy to manage foreign research reactor spent nuclear fuel. Additionally, the letter advised on the convenience of receiving an assessment team to familiarize reactor operators with the program, and to gather necessary information and make essential contacts in advance. A tentative shipment of all eligible South American spent fuel was planned for August 1996.

On June 10, 1996 a fax was received at CCHEN proposing a U. S. delegation to visit the RECH-1 research reactor. After the acceptance of CCHEN, the visit took place on June 21 at La Reina Nuclear Center where the delegation meet with CCHEN¥s personnel.

On June 27, 1996 the CCHEN¥s Board of Directors approved to participate in the first shipment of spent nuclear fuel to the United States from South America. From this date on, two main lines of activities were executed simultaneously: (i) Negotiations and Management and (ii) Technical Activities.

2.- Negotiations and Management

In order for the CCHEN to carried out the several and most diverse activities related to negotiations and management of this operation, it was decided to have a centralized and vertical organization at CCHEN. This was based on the fact that our institution has both roles, that is as Nuclear Regulatory Body and Reactor Operator, providing it with a very fluent communication and control relationships; although, each of these roles are well differentiated and independent within our institution.

The main activities related to this point were the negotiation of contractual matters, safeguard issues and managerial activities related to transportation, security, budget, cost scheduling and public relations with the media.

Above all these activities was the coordination and collaborative efforts performed between CCHEN and DOE, including Washington DC and Savannah River Site personnel. A very complex communication network at the United States side and the need for a clear understanding of documents, resolutions and schedules constituted a difficult test to undertaken by CCHEN personnel. To overcome parallel initiatives and to avoid misinterpretations it was decided at CCHEN to operate under a single general manager, directly supported by a technical manager. The main duties of the general manager were to interact with the United States side at the various levels, to report and consult permanently with the Executive Director and Board of Directors of the CCHEN on decision making issues.

2.1.- Contractual Matters

With respect to the legal framework related to this operation, there were a number of very subtle considerations which needed a quick acquisition and response time. The way this was resolved was through an intense communication link between the General Manager at CCHEN and the United States counterparts. This was also facilitated by the high level of expertise of DOE and Edlow International Co. personnel in charge. The issues related to Nuclear Liability and Title Transfer Location were particularly complex and required of significant efforts of all the parties involved.

At the end of July 1996, the U. S. Department of Energy and CCHEN signed a Contract to transfer 28 MTR type fuel elements from La Reina Nuclear Center to the Savannah River Site in South Carolina. These elements are part of the first 58 fuel elements used in the RECH-1 reactor.

2.2.- Safeguards

Based on the safeguards agreement between the Republic of Chile and the International Atomic Energy Agency (Article 92, INFCIRF/476), it was necessary to apply in the United States safeguards to the spent nuclear material in question. This nuclear material was under IAEA's control during its entire utilization and decay period at the RECH-1 reactor.

This was strictly a negotiation process that took place between the IAEA and the United States proper authorities which arrived to a successful outcome by August 16, 1996.

2.3.- Other Managerial Matters

Several activities were accomplished to insure the physical protection, arrangements with Customs both at the Port of San Antonio and Airport in Santiago.

Among the physical protection tasks the very first was the notification to the highest authorities of the Airport, Port and the Special Police and City Police Authorities. For this we followed the regulation established in the Supreme Act N_ 12 of 1995 "Regulations for the Safety Transportation of Radioactive Material" as well as those defined in the International laws on the subject.

The communication at the highest level of the National Emergency Office and the Authorities mentioned above was facilitated due to the unique position of CCHEN within the Government structure. As a result of this, all the planning and coordination at the various levels was straight forward and expeditious. From this experience, we learned that a high degree of coordination and brief but accurate information was needed to provide to the Authorities in charged, and in this way to guarantee a quick response and to maintain the complete operation under a rigorous centralized control.

For Custom we proceeded in the same way; that is, a formal letter from our Executive Director to the General Director of Customs initiated a process and set up the framework for the follow-up events. All the paperwork and authorizations to do the "temporary admission" of the shipping cask and equipment, and also the "re-exportation" of the spent fuel elements, were done efficiently and in prompt manner. In particular, the operations at the Port in all aspects were really impecable.

2.4- Public Relations

One important aspect during this operation was the CCHEN's handling of the media with respect to public reaction to the transportation of nuclear material. Although the Chilean public in general is not negative to nuclear energy (there are no nuclear power plants in Chile), the influence of the international Green Peace organization tends to bias people to overreact to nuclear activities. In this respect, it was decided at CCHEN to maintain a low profile during the entire operation and only to inform the public through a formal Press Conference. This conference was called by CCHEN's authorities by special invitation to well recognized press media, including TV, Radio and print press, and it took place al CCHEN's headquarters two days before the shipment. The main reason to do this was to inform the public and politicians about the character and benefits of this initiative; as well as of all the safety and security measurements being taken for the handling and transportation of the spent nuclear fuel.

The result of this press conference was achieved 100% with respect to the proposed objectives. It was clear to the media that the work of all the parties involved was thoroughly studied, planned and executed in a serious, detailed and responsible manner. Moreover, it was emphasized that CCHEN was fully complying with the Chilean law and the international regulations related to the transport of nuclear material. Incidentally, it was CCHEN which proposed this same set of laws to the Chilean Parliament several years ago. After the press conference the reaction of the Green Peace followers in Chile was practically null, and from then on the Press was given moderated and controlled access to cover the related news.

3.- Technical Activities

Together with the negotiation and management activities it was necessary to collect the technical information of the spent fuel elements and to initiate several technical activities at the RECH-1 research reactor. Among the most important activities were the gathering of the technical information to fill out the Appendix A (Agreement Spent Nuclear Fuel Acceptance Criteria) of the contract between the United States Department of Energy and CCHEN. Other activities were to prepare the RECH-1 reactor to accept the necessary equipment to transfer the spent fuel elements from the reactor pool to the shipping cask situated outside of the reactor building, to write the physical protection plan for loading and transport the spent fuel elements, the risk prevention plan and the operation procedures for preparing the RECH-1 reactor for transfer operations. The plans and procedures were approved by the Nuclear Regulatory Body within CCHEN.

During the meeting with the United States Delegation at the La Reina Nuclear Center on June 21, 1996 it was agreed that 28 spent fuel elements could be sent in the first shipment from the RECH-1 reactor to the Savannah River Site. Another important conclusion was the impossibility to remove or chop off the end-boxes and/or end-fitting from the fuel elements.

NAC International Inc. provided the necessary equipment for the shipment of the spent nuclear fuel to the United States. These were the MTR Fuel transfer System and the NAC LWT shipping cask. To move the heavy materials and facilitate the operations involved in the loading and transport of the spent fuel elements, a crane of 50 metric ton of capacity, trucks, forklift and pneumatic scaffoldings were rented locally.

3.1.- Technical Information of the Spent Nuclear Fuel

The physical and chemical characteristics, approximate isotopic composition, dimension and weight of the spent nuclear fuel was given in Appendix A of the Contract as required by the Savannah River Site for the acceptance of the spent MTR fuel. At RECH-1 reactor the complete history and technical information per each fuel element is permanently tracked and maintained. This includes manufacturing specification and drawings and the fuel irradiation history of the fuel elements which made a straight forward task to fill out the information in Appendix A.

The HEU MTR type fuel elements for the RECH-1 research reactor were fabricated by the United Kingdom Atomic Energy Authority (UKAEA) at Dounreay, Scotland in 1973. Each fuel element comprises of sixteen flat plates connected to a lower spigot fitting and carrying cross-rods in an upper fitting provided for lifting the element. The fuel plates are composed of enriched uranium (80% U-235) aluminum alloy sandwiched between the high purity aluminum. The outer plates load a half of the uranium content of the inner plates. A summary description of the fuel element and the fuel plate are shown in Tables 1 and 2, respectively.

Based on the irradiation history of each spent fuel element, the additional information required in Appendix A was determined. Particularly, the following parameters were evaluated; burnup and the content of Special Nuclear Material (SNM) after irradiation, period of time that the fuel element stays in core, irradiation time, cooling time, energy obtained per fuel element, dose rate at 1 meter in air and decay heat. All of this information is shown in Tables 3 and 4.

3.2.- Reactor Preparation

Another important activity was to prepare the RECH-1 reactor to load the spent fuel elements into the shipping cask using the NAC's Fuel Transfer System. This is a dry transfer system and consisting of a transfer cask with MTR fuel basket grapple, a transfer cask carriage, a cask adapter and a pool adapter. Due to physical restrictions at the RECH-1 reactor, the transfer cask was used to move spent fuel from the reactor pool to the shipping cask located right outside the reactor building.

A complete technical information of the NAC's equipment was received at CCHEN in advanced. Using this information, the reactor personnel prepared the platform of the reactor and selected the proper location to install the pool adapter base to support the pool adapter. The disposition of the pool adapter is shown in Fig. 1. The platform of the reactor and all working areas were cleared to prevent accidents and to provide enough space for workers.

To prevent any difficulty during the loading operation, a complete inspection of the 20 metric ton overhead crane and the air compressor system was done. The latter one is needed for the pneumatic operation of the cask and tools.

A line of demineralized water was installed for decontamination purposes and to fill out the cask prior to shipment, with the purpose to take water samples to verify the Cs-137 concentration acceptable for shipping. Helium was required for leak testing of the shipping cask closure lid. For this reason, a bottle of helium was provide at the operation area. Helium was also used to fill the cask cavity and maintain the fuel elements under an inert atmosphere during the transport.

In order to have all the 28 spent fuel elements closer to the area where the fuel baskets were to be loaded, these elements were relocated from their original storage racks. Reactor personnel fully documented the new set up of the elements. A temporary platform to support the fuel basket in the reactor pool was also installed.

The Article V.D. and Appendix B (Agreement Transport Package (Cask) Acceptance Criteria) of the Contract requires that a water sample of the storage pool be taken and shipped in accordance with the instructions received from the Savannah River Site.

Fig. 2 shows the Provisional Cask Loading Diagram with a sketch of the fuel element positions with identification numbers of the authorized fuel elements. Fig. 3 illustrates the basket locations in the cask cavity. After the cask was actually loaded, the Provisional Cask Loading Diagram was replaced by a Definitive Cask Loading Diagram describing the final arrangement of the elements in the cask loading. In our case, the Definitive Cask Loading Diagram only confirmed the provisional one.

3.3.- Loading Operation

On August 2, 1996 the giant Antonov 124 cargo plane arrival in Santiago carrying an ISO container housing the shipping cask; and the necessary equipment from the United States. CCHEN's personnel received the material at the airport and coordinated the 20 Km transportation to La Reina Nuclear Center.

The loading operation was based on the NAC¥s Procedure for the MTR Fuel Dry Transfer System used in conjunction with a NAC LWT shipping cask. This procedure provides with the necessary steps to operate the system, assisting the user to prepare the requirement for the operation and to inform the user with the operation features of the system. In spite of the details contained in this operating Procedure, the presence of qualified personnel of NAC International Inc. was essential to expedite the preparation before and during the loading. In this sense, the Procedure is meant to be utilized as a guide by experienced personnel.

After a inspection for damage, the equipment was removed from the boxes on August 19, 1996 and set up at the designed location. When the lid from the container was removed, a Health Physics survey of the shipping cask and adjacent surface of the container were performed.

Once the top and bottom impact limiters from the shipping cask were removed, the shipping cask was carefully raised to a vertical position on the rear cask support and lift it to place onto the base plate. The pressure in the cask cavity was equalized using a vent valve and then the closure lid was removed. Through visual inspection of the cask cavity, six empty baskets were found into it. These baskets were removed using the transfer cask and decontamination of the cask cavity took place.

On August 20, 1996 the written authorization from the DOE to initiate the loading of the spent nuclear fuel into the shipping cask was received. Thus, on August 21, 1996 the loading operation of 28 spent fuel elements was fully carried out. During the process loading of each spent fuel element, in accordance to Article X.E. of the Contract, a description of the observable physical condition was recorded. The results showed no visual evidence of corrosion, pitting cuts or any other physical indication of damage of the authorized fuel elements.

The cask cavity was flooded with demineralized water to do radiological contamination surveys in accordance with the specifications giving in Appendix B. During the same day, at 19:30 hr the first water sample was taken; followed by a second sample collected at 08:30 hr of the next day. The average Cs-137 concentration of 382 Bq/l for the first water sample and 610 Bq/l for the second sample were registered. The level of activity should be under the value specified in Table 1 of the Appendix B. In the case of NAC LWT shipping cask, the Cs-137 concentration must to be less than 278 dpm/ml (4,630 Bq/l).

To remove the water from the shipping cask, pressurized air was blown into the cavity followed by vacuum dried process according to the operating Procedure. Then, the cask cavity was filled with helium and the closure lid was leak tested.

After accomplishing all the about test, the shipping cask was moved back to the container and the impact limiters were reinstalled. When the container lid was installed it was sealed by a IAEA¥s inspector who verified the nuclear material during the loading. Finally, the health physics surveys and the shipping documents were completed.

All the associated equipment used in the operation were packed back in the designated boxes in the same original configuration.

3.4.- Transport to the Port of San Antonio

The last operation was to transport the shipping cask from La Reina Nuclear Center to the port of San Antonio located about 120 Km from Santiago. The transport was done by using the highway from Santiago to San Antonio. The route was selected by the Physical Protection and Risk Prevention Group among other alternatives. The convoy consisting of the container-truck, transit police cars and vans with CCHEN and NAC personnel. This convoy was additionally protected by Special Police Group.

On August 26, 1996 the written authorization from DOE for shipping was received. The same night the convoy left La Reina Nuclear Center towards San Antonio, reaching the port after four hours journey. After arrival at port the container-truck proceeded immediately to the pier where a vessel chartered for this operation was waiting to pick up the container.

On Sunday, September 22, 1996 the ship arrived at the Charleston Naval Weapons Station in South Carolina carrying two NAC LWT shipping casks. One from Chile and the other one from Colombia. The containers were transported by train reaching Savannah River Site the evening of September 22.

4.- Conclusions

It is essential for the Reactor Operator to identify the different local authorities who are responsible for the decisions on the diverse issues related to the operation. In some countries it is conceivable that the decision making process could involve many Government institutions and/or branches, causing compressible complications and delays.

It is recommended for the Reactor Operator to have legal advice at their own Institution and/or at the Ministry of External Affairs.

An important issue is for the Reactor Operator to have a complete understanding of the rights and obligations pertaining to the original contract of the U.S. supplied enriched uranium.

Due to the diversity of tasks to undertake by the Reactor Operator we found essential to work under a centralized and vertical organizational scheme with a General Manager of the operation supported closely by a Technical Manager who is responsible for the normal operation of the reactor. It is highly recommended for both managers to have a capability of communicating with their respective counterparts in the United States. It is also advisable to identify the Top Manager of the U.S. counterpart from the beginning of the operation.

It is recommended for the Reactor Operator to have detailed documentation of the fuel element characteristics, specifications, drawings, irradiation history, water quality records among others.

It was found that the presence at the reactor site of an experience person from the cask owner company, before and during the operation, was very important. This is to resolve critical technical issues that arise and to facilitate the communication traffic between the parties.


Table 1

(c) Full 'Assembly' Description

Number of subassemblies/elements 16 (14 inner plates + 2 outer plates)
Over-all dimensions (cm) 99.3 x 7.46 x 7.47
Over-all weight (g) 4788
Casing Material (Zr, Al, etc.) ----------
Casing dimensions (cm), weight (g) ----------
Side plate material Aluminum
Side plate dimensions (cm), weight (g)* 65.09 x 7.4 x 0.485, 566
Spacer material ----------
Spacer dimensions (cm), weight (g) ----------
End box material Aluminum
End box dimensions (cm), weight (g) See draw. RECH-1-80-00 to -03, 544.6
Braze or weld material Aluminum
Braze or weld dimensions (cm), weight (g) Accounted in the box weight
Other structural material in assembly (include dimensions and weight) ----------


*Side plate weight shall account for any slot volume(s).
Do the fuel elements contain Sodium (Na) ? No


Table 2

(a) Fuel 'Element' Description .................................INNER ..................OUTER

Fuel element type (plate, disc, rod, tube, etc.) Plate Plate
Nominal dimensions (include clad and bond, cm) 62.55 x 7.163 x 0.15 65.09 x 7.163 x 0.15
Active length of fuel element (cm) 59.69 59.69
Nominal total weight of fuel element (g) 194.0 197.7
Nominal weight of SNM before irradiation (g) 13.75 6.87
Total U (g +- g uncertainty) 13.75 +- 1.00 6.87 +- 0.25
U-235 (g +- g uncertainty) 11.0 0.8 5.5 0.2
Total Pu (g +- g uncertainty) ---------- ----------
Pu-239 (g +- g uncertainty) ---------- ----------
Thorium (g +- g uncertainty) ---------- ----------
Chemical form of SNM (e.g., UO2, UAlx-alloy, UC, etc.) UAl-Alloy UAl-Alloy
Weight of SNM (g) ---------- ----------
Fabricated form of SNM (pellets, slugs, ribbons) ---------- ----------
Alloy or dispersing material (Al, SS, etc.) Aluminum Aluminum
Alloy or dispersing material weight (g) 41.69 43.57
Cladding material (Al, SS, etc.) & method of sealing Aluminum Aluminum
Clad thickness (cm), weight (g) 0.046, 138.6 0.046, 147.3
Bonding material, if any (Na, Al-Si, etc.) ---------- ----------
Bond thickness (cm), weight (g) ---------- ----------
Spacers, inactive material (MgO, SS, etc.) ---------- ----------
Spacer dimensions (cm), weight (g) ---------- ----------
Other materials contained in the fuel element:(include dimensions and weights) ---------- ----------


Table 3. Fuel Irradiation History. General Summary

Unique ID No.

Total Weight fuel asse.

Fuel Ass. Loaded

on

Fuel Ass. Discharged on

Time in Reactor Core

Irradiation Time

Cooling Time

Dose

Rate

at 1[m] in air

Decay Heat

[g]

dd-mm-yy

dd-mm-yy

[days]

[days]

[days]

[rem/h]

[W]

D561

4779

18-Mar-81

02-Jan-92

3934

517

1699

71.0

5.38

D560

4788

18-Mar-81

02-Jan-92

3934

517

1699

72.3

5.46

D551

4781

31-May-75

02-Jan-89

4956

652

2794

55.4

3.26

D543

4761

12-Oct-74

02-Jan-89

5190

683

2794

55.7

3.21

D572

4766

31-May-75

02-Jan-89

4956

652

2794

54.9

3.22

D577

4797

31-May-75

02-Jan-89

4956

652

2794

55.4

3.25

D526

4789

09-Oct-74

02-Jan-89

5193

683

2794

58.5

3.36

D528

4775

09-Oct-74

02-Jan-89

5193

683

2794

55.6

3.20

D508

4779

27-Apr-77

02-Jan-89

4260

560

2794

55.5

3.48

D534

4787

29-Apr-75

02-Jan-89

4988

656

2794

55.3

3.24

D583

4782

27-Jan-75

02-Jan-89

5080

668

2794

57.2

3.32

D595

4744

31-May-75

02-Jan-89

4956

652

2794

57.7

3.39

D538

4778

31-May-75

02-Jan-89

4956

652

2794

55.5

3.26

D545

4793

31-May-75

02-Jan-89

4956

652

2794

56.0

3.29

D549

4786

31-May-75

02-Jan-89

3131

412

2794

58.9

3.96

D576

4819

27-Jan-75

30-Nov-88

5048

664

2826

57.0

3.30

D559

4803

31-May-75

30-Nov-88

4924

648

2826

57.7

3.39

D540

4785

31-May-75

11-Oct-88

4875

641

2875

57.5

3.37

D558

4806

31-May-75

11-Oct-88

4875

641

2875

57.1

3.35

D547

4804

31-May-75

11-Oct-88

4875

641

2875

57.1

3.34

D588

4810

31-May-75

03-Aug-88

4807

632

2948

55.5

3.25

D578

4795

31-May-75

03-Aug-88

4807

632

2948

56.4

3.30

D537

4784

31-May-75

03-Aug-88

4807

632

2948

56.2

3.29

D546

4796

31-May-75

11-May-88

4720

621

3030

54.4

3.19

D536

4802

31-May-75

11-May-88

4720

621

3030

53.9

3.16

D539

4785

31-May-75

11-May-88

4720

621

3030

55.8

3.26

D529

4792

09-Oct-74

11-May-88

4957

652

3030

55.4

3.19

D530

4790

09-Oct-74

02-Dec-87

4798

631

3189

54.0

3.11


Table 4. Fuel Irradiation histroy. Assembly Specific Data.

Assembly Pre-Irradiation Post-Irradiation
Unique
ID No.

U

U-235

U

U-235

U-236

Np-237

Pu

Pu-239

Pu-241

Time in Reactor

Cooling Time

Power Level

Exposure Burn up

Decay Heat

[g]

[g]

[g]

[g]

[g]

[g]

[g]

[g]

[g]

[days]

[days]

[MWd/asse.]

[%]

[Watt]

D561

202,300

161,840

134,921

81,571

13,837

0.13

0.7451

0.58

0.04

3934

1699

69.5

49,598

5.38

D560

202,450

161,970

134,174

80,626

14,023

0.13

0.7453

0.58

0.04

3934

1699

70.6

50,222

5.46

D551

205,850

164,680

140,337

86,705

13,448

0.11

0.7142

0.57

0.03

4956

2794

70.2

47,349

3.26

D543

206,780

165,420

140,890

86,991

13,516

0.11

0.7142

0.57

0.03

5190

2794

67.9

47,412

3.21

D572

203,310

162,650

138,455

85,426

13,322

0.11

0.7142

0.57

0.03

4956

2794

66.9

47,478

3.22

D577

205,990

164,790

140,501

86,843

13,439

0.11

0.7142

0.57

0.03

4956

2794

68.6

47,301

3.25

D526

209,730

167,780

139,506

85,558

13,701

0.12

0.7348

0.58

0.03

5193

2794

71.4

49,006

3.36

D528

206,330

165,060

140,914

86,830

13,616

0.11

0.7142

0.57

0.03

5193

2794

69.4

47,395

3.20

D508

208,000

166,400

142,324

88,224

13,474

0.11

0.7141

0.57

0.03

4260

2794

67.6

46,981

3.48

D534

205,610

164,490

140,238

86,683

13,411

0.11

0.7142

0.57

0.03

4988

2794

69.7

47,302

3.24

D583

204,600

163,680

136,979

83,275

13,756

0.12

0.7348

0.58

0.03

5080

2794

68.4

49,123

3.32

D595

207,840

166,270

139,706

85,168

13,981

0.12

0.7247

0.57

0.03

4956

2794

72.1

48,777

3.39

D538

205,810

164,650

140,128

86,475

13,479

0.11

0.7142

0.57

0.03

4956

2794

69.2

47,479

3.26

D545

206,750

165,400

140,499

86,520

13,609

0.11

0.7143

0.57

0.03

4956

2794

67.2

47,691

3.29

D549

206,910

165,530

140,471

86,285

13,721

0.12

0.7143

0.57

0.03

3131

2794

69.8

47,873

3.96

D576

204,490

163,590

136,935

83,131

13,877

0.12

0.7349

0.58

0.03

5048

2826

65.6

49,183

3.30

D559

205,240

164,190

136,689

82,627

14,066

0.13

0.7451

0.58

0.03

4924

2826

70.3

49,676

3.39

D540

206,960

165,570

138,084

83,627

14,122

0.12

0.7350

0.58

0.03

4875

2875

70.0

49,492

3.37

D558

206,250

165,000

137,935

83,674

14,035

0.12

0.7349

0.58

0.03

4875

2875

70.9

49,288

3.35

D547

205,510

164,410

137,184

83,101

14,021

0.12

0.7350

0.58

0.03

4875

2875

69.3

49,455

3.34

D588

204,500

163,600

137,101

83,411

13,810

0.12

0.7348

0.58

0.03

4807

2948

67.1

49,015

3.25

D578

206,780

165,420

139,310

83,999

14,437

0.12

0.7349

0.58

0.03

4807

2948

67.0

49,221

3.30

D537

205,830

164,660

137,711

83,593

13,981

0.12

0.7349

0.58

0.03

4807

2948

69.0

49,233

3.29

D546

203,750

163,000

137,961

83,261

14,649

0.12

0.7348

0.58

0.03

4720

3030

70.2

48,920

3.19

D536

202,710

162,170

137,659

83,155

14,190

0.12

0.7247

0.57

0.03

4720

3030

70.8

48,724

3.16

D539

206,280

165,020

138,002

83,371

14,210

0.12

0.7350

0.58

0.03

4720

3030

67.9

49,478

3.26

D529

205,500

164,400

137,441

83,085

14,146

0.12

0.7350

0.58

0.03

4957

3030

70.8

49,462

3.19

D530

206,280

165,020

137,862

83,583

14,055

0.12

0.7349

0.58

0.03

4798

3189

68.8

49,350

3.11





2016 RERTR Meeting

The 2016 International RERTR Meeting (RERTR-2016) will take place in Belgium. Stay tuned for further details.

2015 RERTR Meeting

The 2015 International RERTR Meeting (RERTR-2015) took place in Seoul, Korea on Oct. 11-14, 2015.
For more information visit RERTR-2015.

Useful Links

DOCUMENTS


ARGONNE NATIONAL LABORATORY, Nuclear Engineering Division, RERTR Department
9700 South Cass Ave., Argonne, IL 60439-4814
A U.S. Department of Energy laboratory managed by UChicago Argonne, LLC
 

Last modified on July 29, 2008 11:34 +0200